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How China Views North Korea’s Readiness to Reform and Its Influence on China’s 
North Korea Policy in the Post-Cold War Era1  
 




China’s policy of restraint (avoidance of crippling economic sanctions) towards North 
Korean provocation is typically explained in terms of geopolitical concern with North Korean 
regime stability. The strategic and diplomatic costs of restraint would suggest the presence of 
non-geopolitical influences behind China’s approach. Ideational explanations emphasise the 
persistence of shared socialist identity as well as the traditional Sino-centric worldview as 
shaping influences. There is much less detailed analysis of how China views North Korea’s 
political economic evolution and how this view has changed over time to produce 
fluctuations in the bilateral relationship. In order to capture China’s motivations more fully, I 
introduce two additional variables, namely China’s view of the state its own reform path 
(which provides the domestic context shaping policy towards North Korea), and the extent of 
North Korea’s readiness to prioritise economic reform. I will then use these variables to 
explain two contrasting phases which represented the worst (1992-9) and best (2009-12) of 
times of the bilateral relationship in the post-Cold War era. These variables also help us to 
understand the potentials and limitations of the upturn in bilateral relations which has 
occurred since 2018.  
 
Key words: China-North Korea relations; ‘economy first’; mono transition; monolithic 
leadership system; ‘parallel advance’; socialist identity 
The puzzle of China’s restrained approach towards North Korea 
 
North Korea’s WMD2 programme has posed a threat to East Asian security since the early 
1990s.3 Accelerated development since 2016 and the danger of direct military conflict with 
the US under the Trump administration highlighted the role of China4 as North Korea’s sole 
economic and diplomatic lifeline. The puzzle arises as to why has China exercised restraint 
towards North Korea despite the disadvantages of doing so. This article argues that the 
existing geopolitical and ideational explanations cannot fully explain the policy of restraint or 
other fluctuations in China’s policy towards North Korea in the post-Cold War era. To fully 
capture China’s motivations, they need to be supplemented by two further variables. The first 
variable is China’s view of the state of its own reform path (which provides the domestic 
context of policy towards North Korea). The second variable shaping China’s policy is North 
Korea’s ordering of economic versus non-economic priorities.  
 
 
China’s restrained approach towards North Korean provocation 
 
In spite of North Korea’s acceleration of WMD development under the Kim Chŏng-Ŭn 
regime (2012-present), China continued to adhere to an approach encapsulated in the three 
principles of ‘denuclearisation’, ‘peace and stability’ and ‘dialogue and negotiation’ 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009) enunciated in the 2000s. In practice, this approach meant 
the reliance on even-handed diplomacy reinforced by moderated sanctions. Even-handed 
diplomacy meant respect for North Korea’s interests while moderated sanctions meant the 
ratcheting up of economic sanctions that would slow but not cripple North Korea’s economy. 
In effect, it represented an approach to denuclearisation that ruled out measures that could 
result in war or North Korean regime collapse. 
 
In the application of economic sanctions, China supported UN sanctions since the first 
nuclear test of 2006 (Arms Control Association 2018),5 but it also insisted on respect for 
North Korea’s ‘national development’ (a euphemism for social stability). In opposition to 
North Korea’s nuclear provocations, China sought to inflict economic pain rather than induce 
economic collapse. For example, North Korea’s third nuclear test of 2013 was met with 
China’s suspension of the ambitious infrastructural projects agreed in the preceding period of 
good relations (2009-12) and some financial restrictions, but private trade was permitted to 
flourish. These measures of the new Xi Jinping administration were acclaimed as a ‘dramatic 
policy transformation’ that contrasted with the ‘appeasing-style’ of 2003-10 (Shi 2015: 26-7) 
but Figure 1 reveals continuously rising level of China-North Korea trade through the 2006-
16 sanctions decade. The rising bilateral trade level was indicative of the continuous 
improvement of North Korea’s economic condition, and by extension, its capacity to sustain 
the WMD programme. In effect, China was taking the sting out of international sanctions. In 
response to further escalation in 2016-17, China supported ‘unprecedented’ UNSC sanctions 
that resulted in the suspension of imported coal, iron ore and textiles as well as the partial 
suspension of oil exports. By the end of 2017, China had fostered a very high degree of North 
Korean dependency, accounting for USD 5.25 billion or 94.7 per cent of North Korea’s total 
trade of USD 5.55 billion. Nevertheless, China refrained from fully utilising its leverage by 
complete suspension of oil exports and tight closure of the border. 
 
Figure 1 about here  
 
China has pursued diplomatic resolution alongside the incremental tightening of economic 
sanctions. In response to North Korea’s accelerated nuclear testing in 2016, China continued 
to display diplomatic even-handedness in terms of sensitivity to North Korea’s security and 
diplomatic concerns by pointing out US military threat and direct negotiation with the US. 
While the Six Party Talks6 for denuclearisation had stalled as a result of North Korea’s 
withdrawal in 2009, China attempted to resurrect multilateral forum during the 2010s while 
combining it with other initiatives. This approach was most clearly manifested in China’s call 
for ‘dual suspension’ with ‘dual track’ negotiations at the lowest point of the crisis in 2017. 
‘Dual suspension’ of North Korean WMD tests and joint US-South Korean military exercises 
would provide a favourable environment for multilateral denuclearisation talks and bilateral 
US-North Korea normalisation talks (Fu 2017: 23).  
 
Diplomatic even-handedness was also evident from the persistence of Chinese high-level 
contact with North Korea. Despite the worsening of the nuclear crisis, Beijing sought to 
avoid the diplomatic isolation of Pyŏngyang. A recent dataset revealed that the mean number 
of China-North Korea high-level visits per year during the 2012-17 period of nuclear tension 
was not the lowest recorded in the history of the relationship (Cha and Lim 2017). Prior to 
the Xi Jinping-Kim Chŏng-Ŭn summit meeting of March 2018, there occurred senior-level 
exchange at both party and state-levels.7 Chairman Kim Chŏng-Ŭn chose Beijing as the 
destination for his maiden overseas trip as Supreme Leader (25-27 March 2018). The 
historical pattern of relations (since the 1950s) suggests that rifts, however serious, are 
followed by renewed cooperation as both sides reaffirm their ‘shared heritage’. The five 
summit meetings between Xi and Kim in 2018-19 conform to this pattern. 
 
 
The costs of restraint 
 
China has paid a price for not using its full economic leverage against North Korea. It has 
been seen as North Korea’s enabler. North Korea’s trouble making justified the very US 
military containment measures that China had sought to avoid. In particular, South Korea 
perceived China’s response to North Korea’s fourth nuclear test of January 2016 to be 
inadequate and decided to deploy THAAD (an advanced US anti-ballistic missile system) in 
July 2016. Perceiving a strategic threat, China conducted economic retaliation against South 
Korea, its second biggest trading partner at the time.8 Beijing had designated South Korea as 
a ‘fulcrum state’ in its neighbourhood diplomacy (Wu 2018: 862) but retaliation for THAAD 
retaliation undermined the careful courtship of the Park Geun-Hye administration. Instead it 
reinforced Seoul’s cooperation with Washington.  Moreover, under the new Trump 
administration’s policy of ‘maximum pressure with engagement’ towards North Korea in 
2017, the US targeted Chinese economic entities with ‘secondary sanctions’ (Hangyoreh 1 
July 2017). These North Korea-related secondary sanctions also fed into the Trump 
administration ‘maximum pressure’ campaign against China in the pursuit of trade 
rebalancing, a campaign that also included tariffs and advanced arms sales to Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan.  
 
The policy of restraint appeared to be at variance with the critical view of North Korea that 
prevailed among a growing number of Chinese policy scholars and commentators. Since the 
mid-2000s, such ‘strategists’ have criticised the ‘traditionalist’ view of North Korea as a 
strategic asset created with enormous blood sacrifice. Instead, they viewed it as a strategic 
liability of limited military value in the age of modern warfare and detrimental to the crucial 
relationship with the US (Kim 2010: 59-63). These critical voices were increasingly reflected 
among well-known scholars and commentators using both foreign and domestic outlets. 
Given China’s system of media control, publication in domestic outlets always reflects some 
degree of official tolerance. An example of an open source associated with the government is 
World Affairs, a journal sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). This journal 
regularly gave space to Zhang Liangui, a professor at the Central Party School and vocal 
critic of North Korea. Zhang viewed nuclear possession as the inevitable product of North 
Korea’s nationalist state ideology of chuch’e (‘national autonomy’) (Zhang 2009). He also 
cast doubt on the economic opening of 2009-10, suspecting a ploy to secure more resources 
for military use while stirring up China-US tensions (Zhang 2011).  
 
Despite the official policy of restraint, the tone of Chinese commentary about North Korea 
became increasingly harsh during the 2010s, especially after the third nuclear test of February 
2013. The prominent case of Deng Yuwen, who was dismissed from his official post as 
Deputy Editor of the Central Party School’s theoretical journal Study Times for his Financial 
Times article of 2013, appears to be the exception to the trend. In the article, Deng claimed 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons posed a direct threat to North Korea and called on the 
Chinese government to abandon its support for the ruling Kim family (Deng 27 February 
2013). This sentiment was subsequently echoed by well-known Chinese scholars writing in 
external outlets. For example, the Cold War historian Shen Zhihua stated that ‘Beijing should 
cooperate with Washington … and prepare for the eventual meltdown of the DPRK’ (Shen 
and Xia 2015: 104). In the same volume, Zhu Feng, then an IR professor at Peking 
University, asked whether ‘President Xi and his team can proactively resolve to dump the 
unnecessary burden of a Kim-controlled North Korea’ (Zhu and Beauchamp-Mustafaga 
2015: 56).  
 
With the worsening of the crisis in 2016-17, prominent scholars further questioned the 
wisdom of official policy and articulated more controversial policy recommendations. For 
example, at a lecture in March 2017, Shen Zhihua harshly criticised Beijing’s decision to 
pressure South Korea economically over THAAD as being devoid of foreign policy sense. 
For Shen, both South Korea and China were victims of the US-North Korea spiral of conflict 
initiated by P’yŏngyang’s nuclearisation. As such, he identified North Korea as China’s 
‘latent enemy’ while South Korea was a potential friend (Shen 2017). Similar sentiments 
were echoed by Jia Qingguo, a professor and Director of the Institute of International Studies 
at Peking University and member of Standing Committee of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference or CPPCC (functionally a type of legislative upper house). Jia 
(2016) questioned the Chinese government’s reaction to South Korea’s THAAD deployment 
given that North Korea was the root (genzi) of the problem. He also recommended stronger 
sanctions including cessation of oil exports, and close coordination with the US regarding 
possible conflict scenarios and outcomes including the fate of the Peninsula post-North 
Korea (Jia 2017). While tolerating more diverse viewpoints, the Chinese authorities did not 
waver from its line of restraint. 
 
 
Explaining the puzzle: geopolitical and ideational explanations 
 
Given the diplomatic and strategic costs incurred, China’s restraint towards North Korea in 
the face of discordant policy voices is a puzzle of both academic and policy interest. The 
geopolitical answer as to why China showed a restrained policy towards North Korea focuses 
on the strategic costs and benefits. Zhu and Beauchamp-Mustafaga (2015: 44-5, 51-2) put 
this argument very succinctly. They argue that Chinese policy makers are motivated 
primarily by security considerations in their dealings with North Korea and from that angle, 
they perceive that the strategic positives outweigh the negatives, whereas western accounts 
normally emphasise the negatives. This strategic assessment is heavily conditioned by 
considerations of the strategic rivalry with the US. The positives include the continuing 
existence of a buffer zone of non-US presence and Chinese influence over North Korea as a 
potential bargaining chip with the US. This would fit with the result of a survey of Chinese 
international relations scholarship that found few policy scholars regarded the Korean 
Peninsula as a Chinese ‘core interest’ (1.85 per cent of articles) whereas most viewed the US 
as the major threat to ‘core interests’ (56.4 per cent) (Zeng, Xiao and Breslin 2015: 261, 263). 
The US was perceived not only as a direct military threat but also to be insidiously 
manoeuvring China towards a costly confrontation with a nuclear armed North Korea. As the 
Global Times (20 February 2016) stated in the aftermath of the fourth nuclear test:  
 
The US does not want North Korea to have nuclear weapons. But if the Peninsula 
becomes peaceful, the US may be worried that the allied South will walk away and 
embrace the North. The US would be happier to see China become a major foe of 
North Korea so the Korean Peninsula troubles will shift to China. The North Korean 
issue has become an excuse for the US to prepare for the rise of China … 
P’yŏngyang made a mistake in its first step of developing nuclear weapons. Now the 
nuclear issue has been pulling China deeper into the mire  
 
By the beginning of 2017, however, the strategic positives were becoming far less apparent. 
P’yŏngyang paid little heed to Beijing in the escalating confrontation with the new Trump 
administration. Breaking with its predecessor’s doctrine of ‘strategic patience’, the new 
administration’s ‘maximum pressure with engagement’ strategy included President Trump’s 
threat to ‘totally destroy North Korea’ (18 September 2017) and intensified secondary 
sanctions against Chinese economic entities. Prominent Chinese scholars also called for 
stronger measures against North Korea (see above). These escalating strategic and diplomatic 
costs of restraint would suggest the presence of ideational influences behind China’s 
restrained approach. Ideational explanations emphasise the tension between China’s 
emerging sense of being a ‘responsible great power’ abiding by international norms (e.g. non-
proliferation) on the one hand, and more established outlooks based on socialist solidarity or 
Sino-centric tributary relations, on the other. 
 
In the view of Noesselt (2014), China’s North Korea policy is shaped by competing ‘national 
role conceptions’ as both responsible global leader and socialist power. Despite economic 
modernisation, China continues to define itself as a socialist power but of a new type distinct 
from both defunct Soviet state socialism and liberal-democratic capitalism. It is clearly 
distinguished from the latter by its continuing adherence to one-party rule (Noesselt 2014: 
1312). Sharing the core value of one-party rule, Beijing cannot renounce P’yŏngyang’s 
‘socialism’ without questioning its own. Since China accepts North Korea’s socialist 
credentials, the party-to-party relationship survives despite periodic ups and downs. When 
North Korea creates military tension, this socialist dimension of ‘national role conception’ 
comes into tension with the emerging dimension of China as a ‘responsible great power’ that 
upholds international norms (Noesselt 2014: 1313). 
 
Easley and Park (2016) locate North Korea in China’s ‘near abroad’ where the traditional 
(i.e. Imperial-era) Sino-centric world view prevails over international norms. That world 
view is built on the norms of stability, siege mentality, expectation of deference and 
Confucian reciprocity. ‘Stability’ means preventing the emergence of national security 
threats. ‘Siege mentality’ means preventing encirclement. ‘Stability’ and ‘siege mentality’ 
resemble the standard geopolitical concern with North Korea as a special ‘buffer state’. 
‘Expectation of deference’ means North Korea should recognise its junior status and embrace 
Chinese practices. ‘Confucian reciprocity’ means expectation of Korean respect for mutual 
obligations inherent in the hierarchical relationship (especially loyalty in exchange for 
protection) (Easley and Park 2016: 657-60). They apply these norms to explain China’s 
responses to North Korea’s first three nuclear tests. China introduced sanctions when North 
Korea showed disrespect by conducting its first nuclear test of October 2006 (‘deference’) 
but the severity of punitive sanctions was qualified by the norms of ‘stability’ (avoid North 
Korea’s collapse) and ‘siege mentality’ (not forcing North Korea into a violent reaction). 
After the second nuclear test of May 2009, however, ‘stability’ and ‘siege mentality’ took 
precedence over ‘deference’ given China’s concerns about North Korea’s domestic stability 
(facing leadership succession) and the hostile state of inter-Korean relations. In response, 
China took active steps to bolster North Korea both diplomatically and economically. The 
toughening of China’s attitude (condemnation, stronger sanctions) after North Korea’s third 
nuclear test of February 2013 is explained by P’yŏngyang’s failure to show restraint after 
having received the diplomatic and economic benefits from Beijing (violation of the 
‘reciprocity’ norm) (Easley and Park 2016: 660-6). 
 
 
Capturing the missing dimensions 
 
These alternative ideational accounts usefully highlight some constant motivations 
underlying China’s policy towards North Korea, namely, China identifies North Korea as a 
fellow socialist regime but also as a junior neighbour that should follow Chinese guidance. 
However, they cannot fully explain China’s two most important policy shifts towards North 
Korea in the post-Cold War era. The first shift produced the low point in relations (1992-9) 
when Chinese economic pressure contributed to economic collapse. The shift towards 
economic engagement produced the high point (2009-12) in the bilateral relationship. 
Chinese resources provided the basis for economic recovery and stable hereditary succession 
in the 2010s. If we take the low point, Noesselt’s emphasis on the constancy of shared 
socialist identity cannot explain why China chose to pressure its ally economically during the 
early 1990s (by terminating trade subsidies). North Korea had only recently demonstrated its 
solidarity by backing the Chinese authorities over the Tiananmen Square crisis of 1989. In 
other words, P’yŏngyang had reaffirmed the shared socialist identity when Beijing most 
needed it. Such solidarity would also satisfy the norms of ‘deference’ and ‘reciprocity’ 
identified by Easley and Park. Their norms of ‘stability’ and ‘siege mentality’, like the 
standard geopolitical explanations, would also have dictated that China keep North Korea 
close instead of exacerbating its economic woes (since these woes accelerated North Korea’s 
nuclear programme to China’s detriment). 
 
Existing accounts cannot fully explain the recent high point (2009-12) in relations either. 
Like the standard geopolitical accounts, Easley and Park emphasise that the traditional norms 
of ‘stability’ and ‘siege mentality’ reasserted themselves in Chinese policy owing to fear of 
inducing North Korean regime collapse. If anything, North Korean actions (permanent 
withdrawal from the Six Party Talks and second nuclear test) demonstrated unity of purpose 
and enhanced material power rather than fragility. Moreover, similar considerations did not 
prevent China from tightly squeezing a much weaker North Korea during the early 1990s. 
The intensification of economic engagement with North Korea in 2009 is also difficult to 
explain from Noesselt’s account, based on China’s recognition of North Korea as a fellow 
socialist regime. In its provocative behaviour during the first half of 2009, North Korea 
displayed little consideration for Chinese interests. Socialist solidarity, therefore, cannot 
account for China’s decision to ramp up its economic support to North Korea in the second 
half of 2009. These accounts overlook Beijing’s appreciation of the subtle systemic changes 
taking place beneath P’yŏngyang’s provocative exterior. Apart from the calculations about 
regime stability or the constancy of shared socialist identity, another important factor for 
consideration is China’s assessment of North Korea’s potential for reform (i.e. its readiness to 
assimilate Chinese-type practices). In the early 1990s, North Korea was considered very rigid 
by the Chinese side (and economically pressured towards change). In the late 2000s, by 
contrast, after a decade of informal marketisation and commercialised trade with China, there 
was more potential for successfully transplanting Chinese-style reform by deeper economic 
engagement. 
 
To capture more fully the effect of this economic dimension behind the fluctuations in 
Chinese policy, I introduce two additional variables for analysis. I begin from the premise 
that China seeks to transplant its own reformist practices to North Korea. This premise 
conforms with the existing explanations of Chinese policy be they geopolitical (enabling a 
‘soft landing’ from the economic crisis) or ideational (viewing North Korea as a junior 
socialist ally or latter-day vassal state bound by traditional ties). Building on this premise, the 
first variable is how China views the progress of its own reform path or the vantage point 
from which China views North Korea. This provides the domestic context of policy towards 
North Korea. In the early 1990s, China had become a reform laggard, having been overtaken 
in economic reform by the new post-socialist economies. In order to regain its reform 
momentum, it started to assimilate the economic tools of neo-liberalism more eagerly in 
tandem with stricter authoritarianism. Against this background, Beijing came to view 
P’yŏngyang’s economic rigidity and aid dependency in an unfavourable light. Adding this 
context enables us to better understand why China chose to apply a strong dose of economic 
pressure to induce its neighbour to reform. By the late 2000s, however, China was no longer 
playing catch-up with the post-socialist economies. Instead, it had established itself as a 
reform leader in terms of both managing continuous systemic transition and promoting 
national development while maintaining one-party rule. Rather than eagerly emulating 
economic neo-liberalism, it was now confidently transplanting aspects of its own experience 
to developing countries by aid and investment. In terms of North Korea policy, this was 
manifested in an incentive-based approach that displayed greater sensitivity towards North 
Korea’s reform constraints.  
 
The second variable shaping China’s policy is North Korea’s ordering of economic versus 
non-economic priorities. Economic priority in the post-Cold War era means the acceptance 
and active support for gradual marketisation. Non-economic priorities are denoted by non-
productive activities, notably prestige projects for bolstering monolithic rule and worse, 
development of WMDs. Given China’s interest in transferring its brand of reformist 
economics in the post-Cold War era, it has strongly favoured North Korean prioritisation of 
economic development. The more North Korea can demonstrate economic reform 
orientation, the more China is inclined to support it. Our framework applies primarily to the 
post-Cold War era because the leitmotif of Chinese policy was very different during the Cold 
War (using material incentive to secure North Korean support in the Sino-Soviet dispute). 
Economic reform was not a powerful factor shaping China’s view of North Korea. The 
interaction of the two variables can be mapped as in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
When China was eagerly assimilating the economic tools of neoliberalism, the domestic 
impulse to accelerate reform also translated into pressure towards unreconstructed North 
Korea (1992-9), resulting in frozen relations. By contrast, having become an exemplar of 
systemic reform and national development that was distinct from liberal capitalism, China 
was ready to transplant its own experience by material input to a North Korea that was also 
seeking a path of economic reform (2009-12), resulting in friendly relations. The current 
period (since 2018) may also be seen in this light. By contrast, when North Korea appeared to 
retreat from reform by co-prioritising WMD development under the slogan of pyŏngjin nosŏn 
or ‘line of parallel advance’ (from 2013), China applied increasing (but not crippling) 
pressure resulting in lukewarm relations (but not frozen as in the 1990s). There is a long 
period of improving relations (1999-2009) during which China transformed from reform 
laggard to reform leader (especially from 2004) and North Korea gradually adapted to 
informal markets and expanded its commercial trade. During this period, China encouraged 
commercial trade with North Korea but did not take the pro-active steps characteristic of the 
2009-12 period. 
 
To highlight the interaction of the variables, I will use them to examine the low (1992-9) and 
high (2009-12) points of the bilateral relationship. During these critical episodes, North 
Korea experienced deep economic crisis (1992-9) and economic recovery (2009-12). The 
latter provided the material basis for the successful continuation of hereditary rule into the 
third generation. They also illustrate the extent (and limitations) of China’s influence. As to 
which sources can be considered representative of China’s changing perception towards 
North Korea, the official position is represented by statements from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA) and by articles from official outlets such as People’s Daily, Beijing Review, 
China Daily and Global Times. All four of these sources reflect the views of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). For greater depth, I also examine a range of expert analyses that 
have become permissible in Chinese open sources. In particular, I make use of World Affairs, 
a journal sponsored by the MOFA whose remit includes ‘to propagate the foreign relations 
directions, policies and strategies of the party and government and to use the Marxist 
perspective to analyse the changing international situation and trend of development’ (World 
Affairs Editorial Office). 
 
 
The low point (1992-9) 
 
This was the longest period without a summit meeting between the two sides.9 Grateful for 
North Korean solidarity during the Tiananmen Square crisis of 1989, China’s leadership 
made a symbolic show of solidarity. For example, Jiang Zemin visited P’yŏngyang in March 
1990 on his maiden foreign trip as General Secretary. Nevertheless, China followed the 
USSR in pursuing diplomatic normalisation with South Korea. By supporting the dual entry 
of both Koreas into the United Nations in 1991, China had already renounced its traditional 
policy of recognising only the North. Nor was Beijing prepared to wait for P’yŏngyang to 
normalise relations with Tokyo. Nevertheless, China continued to pledge friendship and 
material support and several top Chinese leaders visited P’yŏngyang (Lee 1996: 127). 
Despite its friendly exterior, China did not make good on its material promises even though 
North Korea was reeling from the termination of Soviet subsidy in 1990. Disregarding 
previous guarantees, China also decided to abolish the ‘friendship pricing’ of oil exports in 
1991 (with a two-year transition period). The following year, China stipulated that trade 
would be conducted in hard currency at international prices (Lee 1996: 140). Chinese grain 
shipments to North Korea plummeted in 1994 as a consequence, a factor that directly 
contributed to North Korea’s dire food shortages of the 1990s (Eberstadt 1998: 203-30). 
These reverses spurred North Korea into accelerated nuclear development in a gamble to 
ensure security and lure the US into direct talks. The onset of famine in 1996 forced China to 
provide substantial emergency aid, but this did not earn any gratitude from the North Koreans 
(Kim 2001: 386-7). 
 
 
The domestic context: China eagerly assimilates neoliberal economic tools 
 
Difficult to understand from the perspectives of geopolitics or socialist solidarity, China’s 
harsher economic policy towards North Korea becomes clearer if one appreciates the context 
of the Chinese regime’s thinking about how its own political economic system should adapt 
to the post-Cold War environment. Following the twin shocks of the Tiananmen Square crisis 
and Soviet bloc collapse, the future of China’s mono transition strategy (cautious market 
reform within the one-party system) appeared to be in doubt. Having previously led the 
socialist world in economic reform, post-Cold War China now appeared to lag behind the 
new post-socialist states of Eastern Europe and Russia. While rejecting their rapid 
liberalisation (‘big bang’) approach, China eventually introduced its own ‘mini bang’ to 
enhance market orientation at the micro-level (Fu 1995). The ‘deepening of neo-liberal 
capitalism’ meant faster, and more socially painful, market reform measures while 
maintaining tight political control (So and Chu 2012: 174-7). According to General Secretary 
Jiang Zemin (Jiang 1991: 21):  
 
We should continue to allow some people and some regions to prosper before others 
through honest labour and lawful operations while also encouraging those who 
prosper to help those who are still left behind 
 
The restoration of political order and temporary economic adjustment of 1989-90 provided 
the basis for a reinvigorated mono transition strategy. Premier Li Peng described this as ‘the 
relationship between reform, development and stability’ (Li 1991: 12). In support of 
reinvigorated reform, paramount leader Deng Xiaoping undertook his famous Southern Tour 
of the most economically dynamic regions in the spring of 1992. At its 14th Congress later 
that year, the CCP replaced ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ with ‘socialist market 
economy’, a designation that placed market principles and institutions at the centre of 
economic governance (Wu 2009: 41). 
 
Alongside economics, there were developments in the sphere of official political ideology. 
To accommodate the simultaneous demands of economic prosperity and political stability, 
Chinese scholars began to advance the concept of ‘neo-authoritarianism’ from the mid-1980s 
as the substitute for Maoist or totalitarian governance. They drew their inspiration from 
conservative modernisation theory (notably from Samuel Huntington) that stressed the need 
for centralised power with institutionalised participation during times of rapid transformation 
(Li 2015). The exemplary cases were represented by the recent authoritarian capitalist 
developmental regimes of South Korea and Taiwan (c. 1960-87) (Klein 2010: 10). The top 
leaders of the CCP (including reformist General Secretary Zhao Ziyang and conservative 
paramount leader Deng Xiaoping) were reported to be favourably inclined towards the neo-
authoritarian formulation (Sautman 1992: 89). Following the ‘neo-authoritarian’ logic, 
China’s post-Tiananmen leaders emphasised ‘reform and opening’ under the guidance of the 
‘four cardinal principles’ (i.e. commitment to socialism; leading role of the CCP; people’s 
democratic dictatorship; and Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought), which stood in 
opposition to ‘bourgeois liberalisation’ or liberal democratisation (Jiang 1991: 26). Like the 
earlier developmental authoritarianisms of East Asia, China also enthusiastically welcomed 
foreign capital. An official piece attacking ‘bourgeois liberalisation’ made this important 
distinction: 
 
Opposition to such ‘liberalisation’ in China has nothing to do with the capitalist 
system in other countries. And it is not in the least designed to stop economic and 
technical exchanges with the Western countries or to keep foreign capitalists from 
investing in China (An 1990: 16) 
 
 
Effect on policy towards North Korea 
 
These internal developments influenced China’s policy towards North Korea. From the 
launch of ‘reform and opening’ in 1978, China had looked unfavourably upon Kim Il-Sŏng’s 
personality cult and plans for hereditary succession. For example, in 1980, the People’s Daily 
even criticised the hereditary succession as feudal practice (Isozaki 2017: 33). When the 
Chinese leadership finally acquiesced to the hereditary succession, it believed it had secured 
Kim Il-Sŏng’s reciprocal commitment to economic reform. On his frequent visits, Chinese 
hosts repeatedly showed Kim the practical benefits of economic reform. However, North 
Korean emulation was very superficial. When Kim Chŏng-Il visited China in 1982, he 
promised to return regularly to study Chinese-style economic reform but he did so only once 
(in 1983) before 2001. In 1984, North Korea copied China’s foreign direct investment law 
but did not introduce any practical facilitating measures (e.g. development of supporting 
infrastructures or institutions that would ease foreign investment). The main impediment was 
ideological. Kim Chŏng-Il’s status as hereditary successor was legitimised by his faithful 
allegiance to the achievements of Kim Il-Sŏng (S.C. Kim 2010: 128-9). Consequently, North 
Korea chose the tested path of exploiting the old Sino-Soviet divide. After receiving 
improved terms of concessional trade from the USSR in 1984 and 1986, North Korean 
interest in Chinese-style reform diminished (Oberdorfer 1999: 202). 
 
Against the background of domestic change and ideological self-examination, the sympathies 
of Chinese policy makers and scholars began to shift away from North Korea. Despite claims 
of ‘non-interference’ in the domestic affairs of other states, Beijing was becoming more 
insistent on P’yŏngyang mending its ways. For example, in October 1991, Kim Il-Sŏng 
visited China (his 39th and final trip) seeking economic aid and delay to the impending 
normalisation of China-South Korea relations. Beneath the lavish welcome (received at the 
train station by the CCP General Secretary, Prime Minister, and State President), Chinese 
leaders lectured Kim on the necessity of economic reform. Premier Li Peng reportedly 
informed Kim about a recent decision to reform inefficient state-owned enterprises (Korea 
Times 6 October 1991). Much of Kim’s unusually long 10-day visit was spent visiting 
Chinese industrial facilities (Korea Times 8 October 1991). The high-level send-off was not 
accompanied by any joint communiqué (Korea Times 13 October 1991). Following North 
Korea’s fierce criticisms of China’s normalisation with South Korea, General Secretary Jiang 
refused to meet Kim Il-Sŏng’s personal envoy in May 1993 and revoked invitations to North 
Korean party and military delegations that year (Korea Times 6 June 1993). China’s Korea 
policy experts justified putting economic pressure on North Korea on the grounds that ‘those 
countries that live on aid cannot develop’ (Garrett and Glaser 1995: 541).  
 
While reaffirming the traditional friendship with North Korea (Korea Times 1 November 
1994), senior Chinese leaders demonstrated greater enthusiasm for their new found South 
Korean partners, a country that represented a dynamic model of economic modernisation 
relevant to China. On his visit to South Korea in November 1994, Premier Li described 
China’s relations with the two Koreas as ‘equidistant’ and said that China had ‘many things 
to learn from South Korea’ (Korea Times 5 November 1994). In his speech to the South 
Korean national assembly in November 1995, General Secretary (now also President) Jiang 
implicitly repudiated almost everything North Korea stood for (Korea Times 15 November 
1995): 
 
We changed step by step the traditional planned economy into a basic framework of 
socialist market economy.… With respect to political structure, we have stepped up 
efforts to strengthen socialist democracy and multi-party cooperation and political 
consultation under the leadership of the Communist Party. … The reform and opening 
of the past 17 years are enthusiastically received by the Chinese people as they 
galvanized China’s economic development and brought tangible benefits to the people. 
The strong collective leadership group of our Party weathered through decades of 
struggle has successfully achieved the transition from the second generation to the 
third generation [my italics]  
 
 
North Korea’s ordering of priorities 
 
Despite pressure, the North Korean regime resisted following the Chinese example of faster 
economic reform after the Soviet bloc collapse. While respecting China’s decision to 
normalise relations with South Korea, Kim Il-Sŏng told the visiting Chinese foreign minister 
that North Korea would adhere to its own autonomous socialist path and resolve its problems 
by its own efforts (D.W. News.com 2017). While encouraged by the new Kim Chŏng-Il 
regime’s desperate turn towards light industry, agriculture and trade, China’s Korea experts 
nevertheless viewed the nature of reform to be ‘tentative and non-structural’ (Garrett and 
Glaser 1997: 65-7). One even compared North Korea’s plight with China’s Great Leap 
Forward debacle of 1958-61 (‘70 per cent man-made’) (Garrett and Glaser 1997: 65). Rather 
than pursue ambitious economic reform, the new North Korean leadership chose to prioritise 
resources for ‘military-first politics’ or sŏn’gun chŏngch’i. Frustrating as this was for China, 
this policy made sense from the perspective of regime survival. Given the lack of Chinese 
material incentives for reform, it was logical for the North Korean regime to seek survival by 
concentrating its limited resources on maintaining the loyalty of the most vital state 
organisation and social cohort (able-bodied young men). Moreover, as North Korea was still 
consolidating its hereditary succession, the new regime had to emphasise allegiance to the 
achievements of the recently departed Kim Il-Sŏng. 
 
North Korea’s stubbornness, however, was motivated not only by calculations about regime 
survival but also by strong ideological convictions. During the Cold War, it had resisted what 
it regarded as excessive Soviet and Chinese ideological turns (de-Stalinisation, Maoist 
leftism). In the early post-Cold War period, it was resisting pressure to follow the mono 
transition strategy of Deng Xiaoping and his successors. From North Korea’s perspective, 
China was betraying a socialist ally. China excused its parsimonious behaviour on the 
grounds of economic slowdown. Given China’s generous material support under much more 
difficult circumstances in the 1960s-70s, the turn towards commercialised trade (not to 
mention Beijing’s normalisation with Seoul) was viewed by the North Korean side as an act 
of ideological betrayal. Kim Il-Sŏng reportedly denounced China as ‘our traitor and enemy’ 
(Zhu 2016: 579). North Korean officials took pride in the survival of ‘socialism of our own 
style’ (a slogan associated with Kim Chŏng-Il) while the materially powerful Soviet bloc 
perished (Oberdorfer 1999: 233). Subsequent official publications attributed the survival 
from the ‘arduous march’ (the official euphemism for famine) to ‘military-first politics’ (Kim 
2002: 29-30). In spite of its ideological reluctance, the Kim Chŏng-Il regime was forced by 
desperation to tolerate grassroots market practices (as China had done before 1978). By late 
1997, China was beginning to appreciate these developments. While noting that North 
Korea’s military burden remained too high, official Chinese publications also recognised the 
tentative economic changes taking place. For example, the Beijing Review (1997: 7) alluded 
to the trends such as greater priority towards light industry, agriculture and commerce, the 




The High Point (c. 2009-12) 
 
Officially designated as ‘China-North Korea Friendship Year’, 2009 started badly for 
bilateral relations with North Korean withdrawal from the Six Party Talks, rocket and nuclear 
testing. Chinese denunciation and support for UN sanctions, however, soon gave way to 
diplomatic support and economic engagement. On his landmark visit to North Korea in 
October 2009, Premier Wen Jiabao promised to boost North Korea’s economy and living 
standards ‘by whatever means’ (lisuonengji) in order to secure North Korea’s return to the 
denuclearisation talks (Qi 2009). Two-way trade reached its highest level under the Kim 
Chŏng-Il regime (Figure 1). Diplomatically, China refrained from condemning North Korea 
outright over the military incidents with South Korea during 2010. This damaged China-
South Korea relations, and prompted closer military cooperation between Seoul and 
Washington. The new closeness between Beijing and P’yŏngyang was reflected in Kim 
Chŏng-Il’s four visits to China in 2010-11 (May 2010, August 2010, May 2011 and July 
2011) towards the end of his life.  
 
 
The domestic context: emergence of China as a development model 
 
Apart from the geopolitical considerations, the turn towards economic engagement also needs 
to be seen against the context of China’s emergence as an exemplar of successful systemic 
transition and national development. As a transition economy, China had proven itself more 
capable of sustaining high growth rates while implementing gradual (but continuous) market 
reform compared to the post-socialist states that were once considered more dynamic. In the 
decade following accession into the World Trade Organisation (2001), China’s GDP 
expanded five-fold (at current prices) compared to six-fold expansion for 1980-2000. China 
became a middle-income economy whose total GDP surpassed Japan’s. In terms of its 
capacity to finance development cooperation, China emerged as an aid donor rivalling the 
established OECD donors (Woods 2008). According to China’s first White Paper on Foreign 
Aid, the year 2004 represented a significant turning point in the dispensation of aid 
(Information Office of the State Council 2011): 
 
In the 21st century, especially since 2004, on the basis of sustained and rapid economic 
growth and enhanced overall national strength, China's financial resources for foreign 
aid have increased rapidly, averaging 29.4 percent from 2004 to 2009 [my italics] 
 
China’s rapid rise as a successful developer coincided with the global financial crisis and 
stagnation of the Western economies from 2008 and bred increasing confidence among 
Chinese IR scholars and commentators (Lynch 2015). Motivated in part by export markets 
and raw material access, Chinese aid policy of the late 2000s was not a repeat of the 
revolutionary aid practices of the 1960s-70s. In contrast with the drive to assimilate neo-
liberal economic practices during the 1990s, China now represented an alternative model of 
‘managed globalisation’ (Gurtov 2010: 25) capable of harnessing the forces of globalisation 
for national purpose. Despite its relative poverty, it demonstrated the benefits such an 
approach could deliver to itself and others (Information Office of the State Council 2011):  
 
However, China remains a developing country with a low per-capita income and a large 
poverty-stricken population. In spite of this, China has been doing its best to provide 
foreign aid, to help recipient countries to strengthen their self-development capacity, 
enrich and improve their peoples' livelihood, and promote their economic growth and 
social progress. Through foreign aid, China has consolidated friendly relations and 
economic and trade cooperation with other developing countries, promoted South-South 
cooperation and contributed to the common development of mankind 
 
While assuming greater global responsibilities, China was adhering firmly to its own political 
system (Chan 2014: 270-1). In contrast to the Western aid donors’ insistence on liberal 
democracy with market economy (Woods 2008), China’s aid model was distinguished by its 
respect for the aid recipient’s political system (Information Office of the State Council 2011):  
 
Adhering to equality and mutual benefit, stressing substantial results, and keeping pace 
with the times without imposing any political conditions on recipient countries, China's 
foreign aid has emerged as a model with its own characteristics 
 
This changing context coincided with the emergence of encouraging reform signals from 
P’yŏngyang. China’s potential to assist in both North Korea’s systemic transition and 
national development was reflected in Chinese discussions of North Korea during this period.  
 
 
Effect on policy towards North Korea 
 
From mid-2009, official Chinese outlets began to carry many optimistic articles about North 
Korea’s readiness for change, especially following Premier Wen’s October visit. While 
western commentators focused on the launch of the anti-market currency redenomination 
policy in late 2009, Chinese commentators detected positive economic signals coming out of 
P’yŏngyang. For example, they noted how North Korea’s New Year joint editorial (a 
statement representing the combined views of the newspapers of the ruling KWP, the Korean 
People’s Army and Kim Il-Sŏng Socialist Youth League) of 2010 gave unprecedented 
emphasis to the development of light industry and agriculture for the improvement of 
people’s livelihoods (Wang 2010). In the same month, the North Korean authorities 
announced the establishment of Rasŏn as a special city with simplified procedures for foreign 
investors. The move was likened to China’s promotion of special economic zones during the 
1980s (Hu 2010). By mid-2010, the Chinese commentators noted the abandonment of the 
currency reform and the renewed vitality of the informal market. Emblematic of that vitality 
was the Chaeha market in Sinŭiju, the largest in North Korea which was compared to mid-
sized general markets in China (Su 2010). These developments indicated that the North 
Korean regime was now implementing ‘reform from above’ policies in tandem with 
spontaneous marketisation ‘from below’. 
 
On his visit to China in May 2010, Kim Chŏng-Il agreed to retract previous hard-line 
positions (including invalidation of the 1953 armistice). North Korea appeared to be 
responding positively to China’s offer to assist reform ‘by whatever means’. Chinese visitors 
were struck by North Korea’s similarities to China’s early reform period of the 1980s (e.g. 
existence of rudimentary small businesses, ‘two-track’ system of basic rations supplemented 
by market provision, black market for currency exchange). They sensed that North Korea was 
on the cusp of economic and ideological change (Luo 2010). P’yŏngyang’s prevailing slogan 
of ‘feet firmly to the ground, eyes looking outwards to the world’ resembled China’s slogan 
of ‘opening and reform’. Like China of a generation ago, North Korea was also looking for a 
peaceful external environment in order to balance reform with stability (Wang 2011). Despite 
rising inter-Korean tension in 2010, China should continue to act as a neighbour, ally and 
forerunner of socialist reform (shehui zhuyi gaige de xianxingzhe). In this way, the nuclear 
crisis would be resolved from its economic roots (cong jingji genyuanshang jiechu chaohe 
wenti weiji) (Yan 2011).  
 
The death of Kim Chŏng-Il in December 2011 was followed by the rapid conclusion and 
collapse (i.e. February-April 2012) of the US-North Korea Leap Day Agreement (involving 
WMD testing moratorium for food aid). Nevertheless, the outlook for China’s strategy 
remained positive. In this year of ‘strong and prosperous nation’ marking the centenary of 
Kim Il-Sŏng’s birth, Kim Chŏng-Ŭn introduced the first major pro-market reforms (‘June 28’ 
reforms) for nearly a decade. These reforms were interpreted as fundamental reforms (tixi 
bianhua) that made the 2002 reforms look like sectoral adjustment (buju diaokong) by 
comparison. The same source picked up on Kim Chŏng-Ŭn’s comment that ‘rice is more 
important than bullets’ (Wang 2012). Having prioritized light industry and agriculture over 
the military sector since 2010, the economic prospects looked positive (providing the external 
environment remained stable) (Jin 2012):  
 
Since making the transition from the previously prioritised defence sector towards light 
industry and agriculture, the future trend of the North Korean economy appears positive’ 
 
In August 2012, a large North Korean delegation led by Chang Sŏng-T’aek, Kim Chŏng-
Ŭn‘s uncle and reputed number two, visited China to conclude ambitious agreements for the 
joint development of two special economic zones on the Tumen River border. An editorial in 
the official China Daily commented very favourably on North Korea’s progress and China’s 
contribution to it (China Daily 15 August 2012): 
 
Despite the many security and political incidents that have erupted on the Korean 
Peninsula in recent years, China-DPRK relations have been growing rapidly…. The 
growing trade links will provide the DPRK with the commodities and equipment 
necessary to feed its people and improve the productivity of its industry. But what could 
be even more valuable is that such cooperation will enable China to offer the DPRK its 
expertise in managing a transitional economy. China has made remarkable 
achievements in shaking off poverty and finding a development path that best suits its 
conditions and the DPRK could benefit tremendously from China’s experience [my 
italics] 
 
In response to North Korea’s third nuclear test of February 2013, China suspended the 
ambitious cooperation agreements signed in 2012 and allowed only for-profit transactions. 
Nevertheless, market dynamics continued to drive up two-way trade (Figure 1). Chinese 
policy analysts continued to understand the North Korean nuclear problem as a symptom of 
the post-Cold War imbalance (at North Korea’s expense) on the Korean Peninsula. From this 
perspective, China’s role was to boost cooperation with both Koreas and to encourage inter-
Korean relations with the ultimate aim of transcending Cold War divides (Tang 2013). While 
North Korea’s constitutional commitment to nuclear possession (April 2013) was 
unwelcome, the visit of a North Korean special envoy in May 2013 showed that P’yŏngyang 
sought to preserve goodwill with Beijing (Wang 2013). Moreover, the parallel economic 
developments taking place were not lost on Chinese commentators. By the end of 2013, it 
was noted that the North Korean regime was achieving positive economic results. The 
designation of several new economic development zones was seen as evidence of North 
Korea’s interest in FDI and trade (Wang 2013). Chinese commentators also picked up on the 
greater official emphasis on economic development in North Korea’s domestic references 
(Wang 2015). For example, they noted the economic ambitions in Kim Chŏng-Ŭn ‘s New 
Year address of 2016 and the close parallels between North Korea’s ‘our style of economic 
management’ and China’s early reforms (Lin and Jin 2016). As the nuclear crisis escalated in 
2016-17, the officially-affiliated World Affairs paid less attention to North Korea’s ongoing 
economic transformation and more to the immediate geopolitics. Nevertheless, even at the 
depth of the crisis in late 2017, Chinese commentators detected signs of rebalancing in favour 
of economy once more (Zheng 2017). 
 
 
North Korea’s ordering of priorities 
 
Chinese economic input (2009-12) could reinforce North Korea’s economic reformism up to 
a point. Selective economic emulation (especially at the local level) (e.g. Reilly 2014a) was 
not matched by political emulation. The improving economy enabled Kim Chŏng-Ŭn to 
replace his father’s ‘military-first politics’ with renewed emphasis on the guiding role of the 
Korean Workers’ Party, the institutional basis of his grandfather’s rule (Gause 2016: 40-5). 
However, the style of governance remained unchanged as the institutions continued to 
function as instruments of the Supreme Leader. While he cultivated a friendly and inclusive 
style reminiscent of his grandfather (by convening more collective meetings of the formal 
decision-making bodies), there has been no emergence of collective rule on the post-1976 
Chinese pattern. Kim purged many senior leaders. The most significant purge was the 
execution of Chang Sŏng-T’aek in December 2013. Depicted by many western commentators 
as the ‘regent’ behind the young Kim Chŏng-Ŭn, Chang’s status as an interlocutor with 
Beijing could not save his life. Among the charges was the giveaway sale of raw materials to 
a ‘foreign power’. This incident revealed the continuing prioritisation of political 
consolidation over maintenance of smooth relations with China. The convening of the 
Seventh Congress of the KWP in May 2016 (the first congress since 1980) was a further sign 
of consolidation. At the Congress, Kim also assumed the grander title of Party Chairman. 
 
In contrast to China’s de-Maoification of the 1980s, there was no relaxation of the Kim 
family cult in North Korea. The North Korean regime expected prosperity to reinforce 
monolithic rule rather than to dilute it. The regime promoted the slogan of ‘civilised country 
with socialism’ to coincide with the advance of consumerism. This signalled that 
improvements in individual prosperity and social consumption (e.g. recreational facilities, 
housing, education, sporting prowess) would be matched by corresponding devotion to the 
founding Kim dynasty that made them possible (Lim 2015: 147-54). Beijing gently 
encouraged P’yŏngyang to modernise its political system. For example, when China voted 
against a UN General Assembly resolution condemning North Korea’s human rights record 
in December 2015, it clarified that its vote was motivated by support for the principle of 
national sovereignty. It encouraged North Korea to learn selectively from the West, like 
China had done, by ‘resisting Western pressures, but at the same time absorbing what is 
useful’ (Global Times 18 December 2015). North Korea has adhered resolutely to the 
monolithic leadership system. With obvious reference of China, Kim Chŏng-Ŭn criticised the 
‘filthy wind of “reform and openness” blowing in our neighbourhood’ in his report to the 
Seventh Party Congress in May 2016 (Frank 2016). However, the ideological distance has 
since narrowed. Since the 19th Party Congress of 2017, China has introduced a more 
personalised and centralised governing style10 that is more familiar to North Korea’s leaders 
(who have historically been highly suspicious of liberalising trends emanating from China).  
 
On the nuclear issue, China’s economic engagement could not moderate North Korea’s 
nuclear path, a dilemma to which the US held the key. From the geopolitical perspective, 
Chinese economic input could not remove the security threat that persisted so long as the US 
denied North Korea’s legitimacy as a state. On top of that, it also touched upon deeply-held 
North Korean sensitivities about national sovereignty. Simply the fact of dependence on 
China bred resentment from a regime legitimised by resistance to sadaejuŭi (i.e. 
subordination to big powers) (Eberstadt and Coblin 2014). Stable dependence on China, 
while boosting prosperity, also had the potential to erode national sovereignty and by 
extension, undermine regime safety (i.e. akin to the influence the US exerted over South 
Korea during the 1950s-80s). North Korea’s co-prioritisation of nuclear defence and 
economy (‘parallel advance’) from 2013 (thereby ending the high point of relations) could be 
understood in the context of these concerns. Sufficient WMD development would provide 
deterrence and leverage for diplomatic and economic diversification (by luring the US into 
negotiations) without compromising North Korea’s unique political system (the central tenet 
of chuch’e or national autonomy). ‘Parallel advance’ placed China in a dilemma between 
punishing proliferation by economic sanction (its immediate geopolitical interest) and its 
deeply-held belief in reconstructing North Korea along Chinese lines. The dilemma was 
eased when North Korea suspended WMD testing at the end of 2017 and made the formal 
transition from ‘parallel advance’ to ‘economy-first’ in April 2018. The point, however, is 
that P’yŏngyang re-ordered its priorities only after it perceived a favourable bargaining 
opportunity with the US as a result of developments largely beyond Beijing’s direct control 
(advance of North Korea’s nuclear programme, change towards a pro-engagement 





Accounts based on geopolitical risks and ideational affinity (socialist solidarity and 
traditional Sino-centric world view) cannot fully explain key turning points in China’s North 
Korea policy in the post-Cold War era. All agree that Beijing seeks P’yŏngyang’s acceptance 
of Chinese reform practices for practical and ideological reasons. From that starting point, we 
identified two further variables and applied them to explain the low (1992-9) and high points 
(2009-12) of the relationship in the post-Cold War era. The first variable was China’s view of 
the state its own reform path that formed the domestic context of policy towards North 
Korea. When China’s reform model was lagging behind and in need of neo-liberal 
rejuvenation (early-mid 1990s), North Korea also felt the force of Chinese economic pressure 
for reform. By contrast, having become a successful development model rivalling liberal 
capitalism by the late 2000s, China was more understanding of North Korea’s very cautious 
attitude to reform and offered generous economic inducements. The second variable was 
North Korea’s prioritisation of economic reform versus other objectives (notably WMD 
development). When North Korea prioritised economic reform, China was economically 
more supportive. But the ordering of priorities depended upon developments in P’yŏngyang, 
Washington and Seoul that lay outside of Beijing’s direct control. Hence the variables I 
emphasise may be integrated with the prevailing explanations (stressing geopolitics and 
ideational affinity) to produce a more comprehensive account of China-North Korea 
relations. 
 
Geopolitical and ideological motivations mean that China will continuously seek to influence 
North Korea towards the Chinese political economic path. My discussion reveals the 
potentials and limitations of that influence. Even when North Korea is well-disposed towards 
economic reform and assimilation of Chinese practices, it remains totally committed to its 
own political identity as defined by monolithic rule. When China seeks to induce reform by 
economic pressure, North Korea perceives this as a direct challenge to its political identity 
and resists resolutely, forcing China to either relent or induce collapse. When China uses 
economic incentives to reinforce North Korea’s domestic reform impulse, the results are 
more promising. Nevertheless, China still confronts North Korea’s aversion to over-
dependence on one big power. To avoid over-dependence (and potential subordination), 
North Korea has pursued diplomatic and economic diversification by forceful or peaceful 
strategies.  
 
Since the beginning of 2018, North Korea has once again been inclined towards 
diversification by peaceful strategy. This conforms with China’s geopolitical interest and 
objective of transplanting the economic reform model. Since 2018, Chinese commentators 
are once again bringing up ambitious proposals for economic cooperation. For example, Zhu 
et al. (2018) mentioned civil nuclear cooperation and joint management of enterprises in the 
SEZs, two items that appeal to North Korea’s quest for sovereignty and development. When 
he visited P’yŏngyang in June 2019, President Xi not only offered to assist North Korea ‘by 
whatever means’ (lisuonengji) but in an allusion to China’s wider regional development 
plans, he also stressed the ‘community of common destiny’ (mingyun gongtongti) between 
the two countries (Cao 2019). The mutual defense treaty of 1961 also looks set to be renewed 
in 2021. These projected developments indicate China’s awareness of the potential for North 
Korea to return to the pursuit of diversification by force if it fails to achieve normalisation 
with the US. Therefore, it needs to embrace North Korea tightly so as to offset the fallout 
from failure of diplomacy with the US. At the same time, the embrace cannot be so tight as to 
threaten the monolithic political regime that is sacrosanct to North Korea. These complex 
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